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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature ofthe Case

This is an appeal from the third amended judgment of conviction entered against
Appellant Albert Moore. R 146-150. The third amended judgment of conviction which reduced
Mr. Moore's credit for time served should be vacated because it was entered in violation ofMr.
Moore's constitutional right to due process - specifically in entering the order, the District Court
was acting as prosecutor not judge.
B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts

On September 3, 2006, Mr. Moore was arrested for DUI, I.e. § 18-8004, and for driving
without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001. Ada County No. CR-FE-2008-373. While charges from this
arrest remained pending, on April 28, 2007, Mr. Moore was again arrested for DUI. Ada County
No. CR-FE-2008-374. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 890-91,231 P.3d 532,535-36 (Ct. App.
2010). Case Number 373 was assigned to Judge McLaughlin and is the case underlying this
appeal. ROA CR-FE-2008-373. Case Number 374 was assigned to Judge Wilper. ROA CRFE-2008-374.1
Both cases were charged as felonies based upon the State's allegation that Mr. Moore
had been previously convicted of DUI within the preceding ten years - in Idaho in 2006 and in
North Dakota in 1999. Mr. Moore went to trial in Case No. 374 and was convicted. He entered

Mr. Moore ultimately appealed from his judgments of conviction in both these cases.
S.Ct. No. 35486-2008, S.Ct. No. 36033-2009. The two cases were consolidated for appeal.
State v. Moore, supra, and this Court has taken judicial notice of the clerk's record and
transcripts of both cases for purposes of this appeal, per its order entered February 28,2013. R
40673-2013 p. 2-3.
J

an Alforcf plea in Case No. 373, retaining his right to appeal the denial of a speedy trial motion
and the issue of whether the North Dakota conviction could properly be used to enhance the DUI
charge. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho at 890-91, 231 P.3d at 535-36.
In the consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals held that State's Exhibit 4, the judgment
of conviction, copy of the uniform complain and summons, and a bench warrant for a probation
violation purportedly from North Dakota, was improperly admitted in the trial in Case No. 374
because it was not certified and therefore not authenticated pursuant to the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho at 892, 231 P.3d at 537.
Mr. Moore had also argued that the Court erred in allowing the North Dakota conviction
to form the basis of the felony charge because the State failed to establish a prima facie showing
that his guilty plea in North Dakota was obtained with a knowing, voluntary waiver of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. However, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument. ld, 148
Idaho at 894, 231, at 539.
Mr. Moore further argued that the North Dakota conviction could not be used because the
North Dakota statute was not "substantially conforming" to Idaho's statute. And, again the Court
of Appeals rejected the argument. ld, 148 Idaho at 898-99, 231 P.3d at 544-45.
In case 373, the Court of Appeals rejected the speedy trial argument. ld, 148 Idaho at
899-904,231 P.3d at 545-49.
The remedy applied was vacation of the judgment of conviction and remand in Case No.
374. In Case No. 373, the Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the plea
agreement and its decision holding that Exhibit 4 was not properly admitted in Case No. 374.

2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).
2

Id., 148 Idaho at 904, 231 P .3d at 532.

In a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted that Mr. Moore had been given 848 days credit
for time served in case No. 373. The Court further commented, "While not at issue on appeal, a
review of the record indicates that between his arrest on September 3, 2006, and sentencing on
December 31, 2008, Moore was incarcerated for a total of 470 days as a result of the two DUI
charges." 148 Idaho at 891, 231 P.3d at 536, ftnt. 5.
On remand in case No. 374, the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor and Mr. Moore
was sentenced to 365 days all of which he had already served. ROA CR-FE-2008-374.
On remand in case No. 373, Mr. Moore argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his
Alford plea and asserted that he had no valid conviction from North Dakota. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 2, In.

9 - p. 3, In. 2. The Court noted Mr. Moore's objections and then found that the State had now
presented a properly certified judgment from North Dakota and that it was an appropriate
enhancing offense. The Court then stated that an amended judgment would be prepared with the
June 9, 2010 date and credit for time served as given earlier. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 6, In. 3 - p. 7, In. 4.
The Court stated: "The Court will impose the sentence of one year fixed, four years
indeterminate for five years." Tr. 6/9/10, p. 7, In. 3-4. A written judgment exactly mirroring this
language was filed two days later. The judgment imposed a five year term with one year fixed
and granted credit for time served of848 days as of December 31, 2008. R 27.
Neither the defense counsel nor the State filed a notice of appeal from the amended
judgment. ROA.
However, Mr. Moore filed a pro se pleading entitled "Motion for Documents or Petition."
In it, he noted the right to appellate review. The District Court wrote on the pleading that it was
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denying the request, but that Mr. Moore might want to file a petition for post-conviction relief
and seek appointed counsel. R 30-31.
On September 10, 2010, after the time for appeal had passed, the State filed a motion to
correct judgment of conviction and to clarifY credit for time served. The State sought a second
amended judgment to increase the penalty to six years with one fixed and to reduce the credit for
time served to 477 days. R 34-37.
Mr. Moore objected at the hearing on the State's motion. He argued that the 848 days
credit for time served was not a 'clerical' error that could be corrected at any time. He further
argued that the sentence imposed by the Court on remand, both orally and in writing, was five
years with one fixed and that to change that now would violate due process and double jeopardy
guarantees. Tr. 1017/10, p. 7, In. 10 - p.l0, In. 24.
However, the District Court held that it had the power to correct an oral sentence, stated
that it never intended to reduce Mr. Moore's sentence, imposed a term of six years with one
fixed, and reduced the credit for time served to 477 days. Tr. 1017/10, p. 13, In. 1 - p. 14, In. 25.
A conforming written second amended judgment was filed. R 44-47.
Mr. Moore then filed apro se rule 35 motion arguing that the resentencing on October 7,
2010, was illegal because the Court was without jurisdiction and the resentencing was
unconstitutional. He also asked that the sentence be reduced. R 48-50.
The Court did not rule on Mr. Moore's claim that the resentencing was unconstitutional.
Rather, the Court denied the Rule 35 motion's request for reduction of sentence. R 63-66.
Counsel and Mr. Moore both filed notices of appeal from the second amended judgment
of conviction. R 72-82. And on appeal, entry of the second amended judgment of conviction

4

was affinned. State v. Moore, 152 Idaho 203, 268 P.3d 471 (Ct. App. 2011).
Mr. Moore then filed a pro se ICR 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence raising
allegations that the second amended judgment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and was
precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; his conviction was the result of vindictive
prosecution and a biased trial judge; and a violation of speedy trial rights. The motion was
denied and the denial affinned in an unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals filed on
December 19,2012. State v. Moore, S.Ct. No. 39914,2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 764. 3
Mr. Moore continued filing documents in the District Court during the pendency of the
appeal in S.Ct. No. 39914. R40673, pp. 12-14,16-17. And the District Court declined to rule
on them based on its lack of jurisdiction during the appeal. R 40673, pp. 15, 18.
Then on September 25,2012, Mr. Moore filed a motion for credit for time served. R
40673 pp. 19-20. He argued that he should be given credit for time served on the prior DUIs that
were used to elevate the charge in this case to a felony. R 40673, pp. 21-23. Again the District
Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to act while the case was on appeal. R 40673, pp. 2425.
Mr. Moore again filed a motion under ICR 35(c) seeking credit for time served. R 40673,
pp.26-30. The Court then set the motion for a hearing stating that it did have jurisdiction to rule
on an ICR 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Court further stated that it believed that
Mr. Moore had received too much credit for time served and asked both the State and Mr. Moore
to submit in writing how much credit he should receive. R 40673 pp. 31-33.

3

This Court has taken judicial notice of the record and decision in No. 39914. R 40673,

pp.2-3.
5

Mr. Moore complied with the Court's request writing that he had already served 4 years
and 118 days beyond the sentence of five years. He also noted that if he was to remain in prison
as long as IDOC records indicated he would have to serve to complete his sentence, he would
serve a total 14 years 118 days on an offense that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. R
40673, pp. 37-43.
The State did not comply with the Court's request. ROA 40673.
On December 13,2012, Mr. Moore filed another motion for credit for time served
arguing that he should be given a new trial. R 40673, pp. 117-19.
A hearing was held on January 11,2013. R 40673, p. 121.
At the hearing, the Court noted that the State had not responded to Mr. Moore's motion
or the Court's request for a calculation of credit for time served. Tr. 1111/13, p. 9, In. 5-15.
The State responded that it had not received the Court's order setting the case for a
hearing and asking for a written calculation of credit for time served and had believed that the
second amended judgment of conviction had included the proper credit for time served. And
then the prosecutor stated:
However, now reviewing it after your [the Court's] indication that he may have
received too much credit, I believe I was in error in that summary as well by 70
days. I can summarize the dates of incarceration and the days, I believe, he's
entitled to now, if you'd like.
Tr. 1111/13, p. 10, In. 9-15.
Mr. Moore, acting pro se, objected. "Well, I think that the prosecution means that they
couldn't even put their motion in a -according to procedures-procedurally barred from saying
anything." Tr. 1111113, p. 10, In. 20-23.
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Mr. Moore continued:
The reason is that there is nonnal procedure. You get the motion. I get the
motion. They can't say that they didn't get my motion. So if they were going to
investigate anything or even use a little bit of intequity (verbatim), they then said,
oh, why is he sending us this, and check with the court, but apparently they didn't.
Tr. 1111/13, p. 10, In. 25 - p. 11, In. 7.
The Court said that there was nothing wrong the procedure being employed. Tr. 1111113,
p. 11, In. 14-16.
The Court asked Mr. Moore to give it numbers, and Mr. Moore stated that he is entitled
to 750 days served in North Dakota, 848 days originally given in this case, 50 days from Bonner
County, and 21 days served in Challis, Idaho. Tr. 1111/13, p. 14, In. 23 - p. 15, In. 3.
The State then told the Court that Mr. Moore was entitled to 407 days of credit for time
served. Tr. 1111/13, p. 17, In. 17-p. 18, In. 25. The State's math was as follows:
1) Arrest on September 3, 2006, release on bond on November 25,2006: 84 days
2) Arrest on August 1,2007, release on bond on August 10,2007:

10 days

3) Arrest on February 23, 2008, sentence on December 31,2008:

313 days

Total:

407 days

Tr. 1111113,p. 17, In. 17-p.18,ln.25.
After the hearing, the Court entered the third amended judgment of conviction granting
Mr. Moore only 407 days credit for time served. R 40673 pp. 125-28.
Mr. Moore filed a timely notice of appeal. R 40673 pp. 146-50.
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III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the District Court violate Mr. Moore's state and federal constitutional rights to due
process by taking on the role of prosecutor in decreasing Mr. Moore's credit for time served by
70 days? U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Third Amended Judgment of Conviction Was Entered in Violation ofMr.
Moore's State and Federal Constitutional Rights to Due Process

The 'right to due process requires an impartial judge.' State v. Lanliford, 116
Idaho 860, 875, 781 P.2d 197,212 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct.
3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 803 (1990). A trial judge must avoid the appearance of
advocacy or of partiality, but at the same time is not 'expected to sit mute and
impassive, speaking only to rule on motions or objections.' United States. V
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 552-53 (9 th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v.
Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 749 (9 th Cir. 1978)). If a judge engages in prosecutorial
acts, such acts may be violative of the defendant's constitutional rights. Lanliford,
116 Idaho at 875, 781 P.2d at 212.
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 913, 71 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2003).

In this case, the District Court took on the role of prosecutor when it determined on its
own initiative that it had previously given Mr. Moore too much credit for time served. The Court
acted as prosecutor in originally presenting the theory that it may have given Mr. Moore too
much credit for time served in its second amended judgment. At that point, the Court called on
both Mr. Moore and the prosecutor to present written calculations of the time served. Mr. Moore
did so. The State did not submit anything. Then, the State at the hearing when called upon by
the Court did finally present a calculation - but only over Mr. Moore's objection. As Mr. Moore
stated, "The reason [for objection] is that there is a normal procedure. You [the Court] get the
motion. I get the motion .... " Tr. 1111/13, p. 10, In. 25 - p. 11, In. 7. Here the Court did not
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follow the normal procedure, but rather took on the role of the prosecutor.
"The trial court 'must not take on the role of a partisan .... Prosecution and judgment are
two separate functions in the administration of justice; they must not merge. '" Robinson v.
United States, 513 A.2d 218,222 (D.C. 1986). Robinson held that the court's suggestion ofa

tactical course that the prosecution had not considered was improper. See a/so, Davis v. United
States, 567 A.2d 36,41 (D.C. 1989), stating that ajudge's substantial interference in a trial can

so prejudice the defendant as to require a new trial. See also, Lanliford, supra, and Lopez v.
Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (1980).

As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness ... to
perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. '" In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623,625 (1955), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348

U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).
In this case, the Court took on the role of the prosecutor - indeed took on the role with
more vigor than the prosecutor had applied to the case - determining on its own initiative that Mr.
Moore had received too much credit for time served and pursuing that determination even when
the State failed to respond to its request for a written calculation. This action denied Mr.
Moore's due process rights. Murchison, supra, Lanliford, supra.
Because Mr. Moore objected, the question on appeal is whether the deprivation of due
process was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P .3d
961 (2010), holding that the Chapman harmless error standard applies to all objected-to error.
9

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). And, in this case, the

error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the District Court not taken it upon itself
to recalculate Mr. Moore's credit, the State would not have pursued the matter and Mr. Moore
would have not lost 70 days credit for time served.
Based upon this denial of due process, Mr. Moore requests that this Court vacate the third
amended judgment of conviction and direct that the credit given in the second amended judgment
be reinstated.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Moore respectfully requests that the third amended
judgment of conviction be vacated and the second amended judgment be reinstated.
Dated

thiS~day of July, 2013.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Albert
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